COLUMN: Iraq – The road ahead, part 3

The current chaotic situation in Iraq serves as a constant reminder that indeed the United States and its allies have a long way to go to accomplish their goals for a safer, more democratic Iraq. New threats have replaced older ones, and without a sustained military, government, and humanitarian effort, return to normalcy may become impossible. In a recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations committee, a senior official with RAND Corporation, a conservative think tank, noted that the United States has only a small window of a few months to get it right in Iraq. Once that window is closed, our chances for success become very small.

Whereas the United States and its allies are crossing their fingers and hoping that things will turn out OK in Iraq, just in time for presidential elections, additional statements by an Army official seem to lend little credibility to the administration’s claims that it had made efforts prior to the war to secure peace in Iraq. According to the official, the administration spent nine months preparing for war and 28 days preparing for peace. Such failure to plan for what would inevitably be a post-Saddam Iraq has raised serious concerns about the president’s true intentions for invading Iraq. Considering this failure to adequately plan for the reconstruction of Iraq, and having gotten it mostly wrong throughout the last 10 months (remember ‘mission accomplished’ speech) many are now bringing forth studies that were either ignored by the administration or were simply refused prior to the war.

Among the more notable are studies conducted by the State Department, the U.S. Army and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). There are at least four elements that these studies have in common with regards to the direction toward which the reconstruction efforts in Iraq should be directed.

The first and foremost issue that must come in focus is that of security. Extremists and loyal Baathists continue to exploit instability and insecurity to further their own goals. They have clearly stated that they intend to ignite a sectarian war between the Shiites and the Sunni. Without providing security for the Iraqi civilians and humanitarian non-governmental organizations, it is very likely that U.S. efforts to stabilize the country, and especially the Sunni triangle, will not be effective. For political, business, and social entities to flourish, it is expedient that law and order be restored.

The second issue that must be addressed is the provision of fertile ground for political and social reforms. Free market and democratic ideas must be dealt with in the context of authentic social and political norms, without alienating or intruding on certain religious facets of the society. This particular aspect must be approached carefully, to ensure the inclusion of all segments of society. The way the United States addresses this question, might very well determine the future shape of Iraqi politics.

The third necessary element is the reorganization of the current handling of reconstruction efforts in Iraq. As set up initially by the administration, the Department of Defense was the sole U.S. agency trusted with managing every aspect of the reconstruction – from security, to humanitarian aid, to granting business licenses, or setting up political entities. The administration must include the Department of State, the Treasury, the Commerce, and other agencies in the administering of the efforts.

Lastly, given the finite nature of both political and financial capital, the administration must consider alternatives to governing Iraq all on its own, such as providing a greater role for the United Nations, especially in administering humanitarian aid. This inclusion would bring on board military personnel from Pakistan and India, two countries that have refused to do so without a U.N. mandate.

In conclusion, one may safely note that the current security, humanitarian and political conditions in Iraq warrant a fresh look at solutions and recommendations. All those listed above are essential in carrying out successfully the purported goal of democratization of Iraq, but perhaps none is more important than the commitment to stick it out. As an outspoken critic of the war in Iraq, I believe that the administration made a mistake in going to war against Iraq, but it is imperative that we see the project to the end. That doesn’t mean we need to stay the course, as the president is fond of saying. Instead, it means that we must accept that we were ill-prepared for peace and that we must begin to do the right things quick. Perhaps it means that we need a president with a fresh perspective – a new president.

Medlir Mema is a senior majoring in political science. Comments can be sent to medlirm@cc.usu.edu.