COLUMN: Musharraf’s Pakistan–the key to a stable Afghanistan
It has been almost two years since the United States and its allies began their offensive in Afghanistan, in what has since become one of the fronts of the war on terror. Indeed, one would have thought, considering the extensive Taliban and al-Qaeda ties in the country, that Afghanistan would have remained the focus, rather than a footnote, of the war on terror. Unfortunately, since major combat operations ended there, attention has shifted elsewhere.
That doesn’t mean, however, that the intentions of the Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants have changed or been mollified. Currently, they undertake almost daily incursions against NATO troops there, as well as humanitarian and aid agency workers. Most attacks occur along the long and porous Pakistani-Afghani borders, with Taliban forces planning and staging attacks from safe havens inside Pakistan.
On speaking with a State Department employee who had just returned from Kandahar, Afghanistan, it became clear that a series of new measures need to be taken in the region on the part of the Afghani and American governments. Possibly the most contentious issue that needs and must be addressed is the political situation in Pakistan and its relationship with the new Afghani government. There have been some insinuations on the part of the Kharzai administration, as well as the U.S. government, that Gen. Musharraf of Pakistan is doing very little to control the insurgent Talibani forces and to eliminate the possibility of that force to use the Pakistani mountainous terrain as a staging ground for attacks against allied troops and Afghani civilians.
Whereas such accusations may reflect the disposition of some government officials in Pakistan toward Kharzai’s government, they are more revelatory of the mood in the street. Certain tribal leaders in northern Pakistan have provided help and support for the insurgents despite efforts on the part of the administration to bring those leaders in line with the government’s policy.
Unfortunately, these actions come at a time when Musharraf’s grip in the country has been lessened and Islamic extremist groups have been gaining more support from the general populace. Some of these troubles for Musharraf are of his own making. By outlawing and intimidating most opposition secular parties to advance his own purposes, he has eliminated the possibility of any viable alternative to the fundamentalist Islamic calls for an Islamic state.
In addition, Musharraf’s openly pro-U.S. stance prior and during the war in Afghanistan has earned him more enemies than friends in the country. Since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan there have been two serious assassination attempts and just recently, on a Sept. 28 televised video on al-Jazeera television, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s right hand, renewed the call to assassinate Gen. Musharraf (The Economist, Oct. 4, 2003). The Pakistanis, in general, have misgivings about the unconditional support Musharraf is giving the United States, since most of them remember the total abandonment on the part of the United States once the Soviets abandoned Afghanistan and there was no apparent need for Pakistani military bases. With the abandonment came broken promises for grants and loans, as well as the imposition of sanctions on Pakistan for having acquired nuclear weapons.
This is where the U.S. government can and should do more to appease the populace and reassure the Pakistani government that the United States is not a fair-weather friend. This is especially important given the interminable nature of the war on terror. By providing aid and support for Pakistan, the United States can strengthen the hand of the government against the rising Islamic fundamentalist threat in the country. Simultaneously, the U.S. government will gain leverage vis-Ã -vis Musharraf’s government, with respect to the opening up of the political system to secular opposition parties as well as diffusing the current stalemate between India and Pakistan.
Emboldened by a show of support on the part of the United States, Musharraf might be more willing to take on the radical Islamic groups calling for his overthrow and convince tribal leaders in the north to abandon their support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This in turn will result in the disintegration and (hopefully) elimination of hot-pockets along the Pakistani-Afghani border, which will ensure the stabilization of Afghanistan.
Medlir Mema is a senior majoring in political science. Comments can be sent to medlirm@cc.usu.edu.