COLUMN: Would I ever condone war? Yes, but…
More often than not, mudslinging impedes effective democracy.
Rather than fostering healthy, constructive debate, it sinks us deeper into turmoil and detracts from the issues at hand. Yet, on rare occasions, even tirades can serve as catalysts for serious discussion.
I was on the receiving end of many last week, but one contained a value-laden question that begs a response. The query was simply worded: “Would you ever condone war?
My answer to that inquiry is, yes. Perhaps, I would.
I was in India in 1999, when hordes of armed infiltrators, presumably from Pakistan, poured over the country’s northern border in an attempt to usurp Indian territory in strife-ridden Kashmir. Most Indians feared an all-out, potentially nuclear conflict with Pakistan, and hence I thought it only rational – and in keeping with the doctrine of pre-emptive war – for India to take military action.
There was an immediate and direct threat to the sovereignty of the Indian state, and India responded. It was a war waged within the bounds of reason.
I also supported the Gulf War. When the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait in 1990, it jeopardized that country’s independence, and threatened Saudi Arabian oil. Then President George H.W. Bush acted decisively in response to a Saudi call for help. For months, his administration worked with the United Nations and its allies to assemble a formidable force that eventually liberated Kuwait in 1991.
That war I backed passionately, even though members of my family were in the United Arab Emirates at the time, where the impact of the fighting was closely felt.
But the war we currently face is very different from these other conflicts. It is a war that is only loosely tied in to the broader war on terrorism, and even what little connection there may be is not known as the Bush administration has kept from the American people any specific evidence it claims to have in its possession.
This is a preventive war, and by definition, there may not be any evidence that Iraq was poised to do battle with the United States. What, then, separates this crusade from self-righteous muscle-flexing?
Furthermore, the premise of this war is flawed. Let me explain.
If these hostilities are indeed about Iraqi freedom, then one must ask who will profit from this war. The natural response is, of course, the Iraqi people. But who, really, are the Iraqi people?
A cursory study of modern-day Iraq would reveal a country torn apart by ethnic conflict. According to the 2002 CIA World Fact Book, the Arabs, who make up between 75 percent to 80 percent of the population, can’t get along peaceably with the Kurds, who make up between 15 percent to 20 percent. Additionally, the Kurds detest both the Arabs and the Turks, who with the Assyrians and other miscellaneous groups make up about 5 percent of the population.
Then there is the problem of religion.
While much of Iraq is Muslim, the Sunni and Shiite sects of Islam have never seen eye to eye. For decades, the Sunnis, and most notably Saddam Hussein, have lorded it over the Shiites. Consequently, it might be difficult, if not impossible, for the two groups to reconcile their opposing interests in forming a new government.
Turkish columnist Taha Akyol, writing in The Turkish Press Review, paints a frightening picture of what may lie ahead by posing a series of rhetorical questions: “If the bull of war comes into this china shop,” he writes, “Would the Shiites and Kurds revolt again? What would their political demands be? Would a civil war break out with counterattacks against the battered remains of Saddam’s collapsed regime?”
He points out that when the Shiites and Kurds revolted during the Gulf War, Hussein stopped them with blood and terror until American and British “no-fly zones” were established to stop him.
“If Saddam and his regime are removed from power during the war, and angry groups revolt again and civil conflicts break out, who will ensure order? U.S. forces? How would a new regime be established? Once the central authority collapses, will the ethnic factions who have a tradition of revolt and separation fight for competing regimes? What would be the result of all this?” Akyol continues.
These are tough questions, which do not lend themselves to easy answers, and I fear it may be too late by the time the full impact of this war is finally acknowledged.
Leon D’Souza is a senior majoring in journalism. Comments can be sent to leon@cc.usu.edu.